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There is controversy about whether geography matters mainly because of its contemporaneous impact
on economic outcomes or because of its interaction with historical events. Looking at terrain ruggedness,
we are able to estimate the importance of these two channels. Because rugged terrain hinders trade
and most productive activities, it has a negative direct effect on income. However, in Africa rugged
terrain afforded protection to those being raided during the slave trades. Since the slave trades retarded
subsequent economic development, in Africa ruggedness has also had a historical indirect positive
effect on income. Studying all countries worldwide, we find that both effects are significant statistically
and that for Africa the indirect positive effect dominates the direct negative effect. Looking within















Rugged terrain is tough to farm, costly to traverse, and often inhospitable to live in; yet in Africa,
countrieswitharuggedlandscapetendtoperformbetterthanﬂatterones. Toexplainthisparadox,
this paper reaches back more than two centuries — to the slave trades.
In Africa, between 1400 and 1900, four simultaneous slave trades, across the Atlantic, the Sahara
Desert, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, led to the forced migration of over 18 million people,
with many more dying in the process (Africa’s total population was roughly stable over this period
at 50–70 million). The economies they left behind were devastated: political institutions collapsed,
and societies fragmented. For African people ﬂeeing this slave trade over the centuries, rugged
terrain was a positive advantage. Enslavement generally took place through raids by one group
on another, and hills, caves and cliff walls provided lookout posts and hiding places for those
trying to escape. Today, however, that same geographical ruggedness is an economic handicap,
making it expensive to transport goods, raising the cost of irrigating and farming the land, and
simply making it more expensive to do business.
We exploit the historical importance of terrain ruggedness within Africa to inform the debate
that has arisen about the importance of geography for economic development. While it is com-
monly agreed that geography can have important consequences for economic outcomes, there is
a growing debate over the channel of causality. Some authors stress a direct contemporaneous
channel whereby geography directly affects economic outcomes today. For instance, Gallup and
Sachs (2001) and Sachs and Malaney (2002) claim that a disease-prone environment has substantial
negative consequences for current income levels because it reduces productivity, lowers the in-
centives to invest in human capital, draws scarce resources towards medical care, and discourages
foreign investment and tourism.1 Alternatively, other authors stress an indirect channel whereby
geography indirectly affects economic outcomes today through its past interactions with key his-
torical events. For instance, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) argue that the importance
of a disease-prone environment for current income levels lies in the effect that it had on potential
settler mortality during colonization. In areas were high mortality discouraged Europeans from
settling, colonizers implemented poor institutions which adversely affected subsequent economic
development.2
Generally, it is difﬁcult to separate the direct/contemporaneous and the indirect/historical
channels. A key obstacle is that the geographical features on which the literature has focused
only affect the areas that were also subject to the historical events of interest. For instance, tropical
1Other geographical characteristics that have been linked to economic outcomes through a direct contemporaneous
channel include proximity to the coast, and the prevalence of desert or tropical climate (Kamarck, 1976, Mellinger, Sachs,
and Gallup, 2000, Sachs, 2001, Rappaport and Sachs, 2003).
2Other papers that argue for connections between the physical environment and economic outcomes through his-
torical interactions include Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002), Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), Diamond (1997), and
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002).
1diseases, today and historically, do not affect the parts of the world that were not colonized.3 This
obstacle is absent in the case of terrain ruggedness: the long-term, positive effect of ruggedness,
through fending off the slave-traders, is concentrated in African countries, where the trade took
place; while the contemporaneous, negative effect is universal. Thus, we are able to separately
estimate, for one geographic characteristic, both the direct contemporaneous channel and the
indirect historic channel. We can also identify the indirect historic channel by using estimates,
constructed by Nunn (2008), of the number of slaves taken from each country in Africa. He com-
bines historical shipping records with slave inventories reporting slave ethnicities, and ﬁnds that
the slave trades had adverse effects on subsequent economic development because they weakened
indigenous political structures and institutions, and promoted ethnic and political fragmentation.
This is consistent with the ample historical evidence documenting the adverse long-term effects of
Africa’s slave trades.
Wedescribeinsection2howwemeasureterrainruggedness(datasourcesforallothervariables
employed in the analysis are detailed in the appendix). Then, after introducing the economet-
ric framework in section 3, we investigate the relationship between ruggedness and income in
section 4. We ﬁnd that both the direct and indirect effects of ruggedness on income exist and
are statistically signiﬁcant. The results are very robust. Looking within Africa, in section 5 we
provide evidence that the indirect positive effect of ruggedness operates through the slave trades.
We also estimate each of the coefﬁcients for each of the channels implicit in the indirect effect
of ruggedness. We ﬁnd support for each of the underlying relationships: ruggedness negatively
affects slave exports, and slave exports negatively affect the quality of domestic institutions, which
is an important determinant of per capita income.
2. Terrain ruggedness
The adverse effects that rugged terrain has on economic outcomes are well established. Irregular
terrain makes cultivation difﬁcult. On steep slopes erosion becomes a potential hazard, and the
control of water (e.g. irrigation) becomes much more difﬁcult. According to the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization (1993), when slopes are greater than 2 degrees, the beneﬁts of cultivation often
do not cover the necessary costs, and when slopes are greater than 6 degrees cultivation becomes
impossible. In addition, because of the very high costs involved in earthwork, building costs are
much greater when terrain is irregular (Rapaport and Snickars, 1999, Nogales, Archondo-Callao,
and Bhandari, 2002). As well, transportation over irregular terrain is slower and more costly.4
3Because of these difﬁculties, few studies attempt to quantify or directly test for the relative importance of the
two channels. One notable exception is Easterly and Levine (2003), who employ tests of over-identifying restrictions
in an instrumental variables framework. They conclude that measures of tropics, germs, and crops do not explain
economic development beyond their ability to explain institutional development. A related difﬁculty is that the physical
environment is extremely persistent. An interesting exception is rainfall, which Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004)
use as an instrumental variable to investigate the effect of economic growth on the likelihood of civil conﬂict.
4A recent study by Allen, Bourke, and Gibson (2005) highlights these negative effects of irregular terrain within
Papua New Guinea. The authors show that steep terrain not only makes the production of cash crops very difﬁcult, but
it also makes it much more costly or even impossible to transport the crops to the markets. The end result is that the
populations living in these parts of Papua New Guinea have lower incomes and poorer health.
2In Africa, we expect terrain ruggedness to also have beneﬁcial effects by having helped areas
avoid the negative long-term consequences of the slave trades. The most common method of
enslavement was through raids and kidnapping by members of one ethnicity on another, or
even between members of the same ethnicity (Northrup, 1978, Lovejoy, 2000). Rugged terrain
afforded protection to those being raided during Africa’s slave trades, provided caves for hiding,
and provided the ability to watch the lowlands and incoming paths. African historians have
documented many examples of this. For instance, Bah (1976) describes how “[t]hroughout time,
caverns, caves and cliff walls have served as places of refuge for people. [...] There are many
examples of this defensive system in Africa. At Ebarak (south- eastern Senegal), there are still
traces left of a tata wall near a cave in which the Bassaris, escaping from Fulani raids, hid.” Writing
about what is now Mali, Brasseur (1968) explains that “[h]idden in the uneven terrain, they [the
Dogon] were able to use the military crests and, as far as the techniques of war at the time were
concerned, were impregnable.”5
When measuring terrain ruggedness, our purpose is to have a measure that captures small-scale
terrain irregularities, such as caverns, caves and cliff walls that afforded protection to those being
raided during the slave trades. We do so by calculating the terrain ruggedness index, originally
devised by Riley, DeGloria, and Elliot (1999) to quantify topographic heterogeneity in wildlife
habitats providing concealment for preys and lookout posts. The main beneﬁts of this measure are
that it quantiﬁes terrain irregularities at a very ﬁne level and it was designed to capture precisely
the type of topographic features we are interested in. Other measures that have been used by
economists and political scientists are typically constructed to capture the presence of large-scale
terrain irregularities, and mountains in particular.6 Nevertheless, we show below that the results
are robust to the use of alternative measures of terrain ruggedness.
Our starting point is gtopo30 (us Geological Survey, 1996), a global elevation data set de-
veloped through a collaborative international effort led by staff at the us Geological Survey’s
Center for Earth Resources Observation and Science (eros). Elevations in gtopo30 are regularly
spaced at 30-arc seconds across the entire surface of the Earth on a map using a geographic
projection. The sea-level surface distance between two adjacent grid points on a meridian is half a
nautical mile or, equivalently, 926 metres.
Figure 1 represents a few 30 by 30 arc-second cells, with each cell centred on a point on from
the gtopo30 elevation grid. The ruggedness calculation takes a point on the Earth’s surface like
5For additional evidence, see Marchesseau (1945), Podlewski (1961), Gleave and Prothero (1971), Bah (1985, 2003),
Cordell (2003), and Kusimba (2004).
6For example, Gerrard (2000) constructs a measure of the percentage of each country that is covered by mountains,
which is used by Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoefﬂer (2004) and others in studies of civil war and con-
ﬂict. Ramcharan (2006) uses data from the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (2003) on the
percentage of each country within different elevation ranges in an instrumental-variables analysis of how economic
diversiﬁcation affects ﬁnancial diversiﬁcation. An exception to the focus on large-scale terrain irregularities is the article
by Burchﬁeld, Overman, Puga, and Turner (2006), who construct measures of both small-scale and large-scale irregular-
ities and show that they have opposite effects on the scatteredness of residential development in us metropolitan areas.
Burchﬁeld et al. (2006) measure small-scale terrain irregularities using the same terrain ruggedness index of Riley et al.
(1999) that we use in this paper. Olken (2006) also uses small-scale terrain irregularities to compute a predicted measure



























Figure 1: Schematic of the terrain ruggedness calculation
the one marked by a solid circle in the centre of ﬁgure 1 and calculates the difference in elevation
between this point and the point on the grid 30 arc-seconds North of it (the hollow circle directly
above it in the ﬁgure). The calculation is performed for each of the eight major directions of the
compass (North, Northeast, East, Southeast, South, Southwest, West, and Northwest). The terrain
ruggedness index at the central point of ﬁgure 1 is given by the square root of the sum of the
squared differences in elevation between the central point and the eight adjacent points. More
formally, let er,c denote elevation at the point located in row r and column c of a grid of elevation





i=c 1(ei,j   er,c)2. Finally, we average across all grid cells in the country not covered by
water (taking into account when averaging the latitude-varying sea-level surface that corresponds
to the 30 by 30 arc-second cell centred on each point) to obtain the average terrain ruggedness of
the country’s land area.
The units for the terrain ruggedness index correspond to the units used to measure elevation
differences. In our calculation, ruggedness is measured in hundreds of metres of elevation differ-
ence for grid points 30 arc-seconds (926 metres on a meridian) apart. Examples of countries with an
average ruggedness that corresponds to nearly level terrain are Netherlands (terrain ruggedness
0.037) and Mauritania(0.115). Romania (1.267) and Zimbabwe (1.194) have mildly rugged terrain
on average. Countries with terrain that is moderately rugged include Italy (2.458) and Djibouti
(2.432). Highly rugged countries include Nepal (5.043) and Lesotho (6.202). Basic summary
statistics for our ruggedness measure and correlations with other key variables are reported in
table 8 in the data appendix.
43. Econometric framework
We now develop our estimation strategy for investigating the relationship between ruggedness
andincome. Asdiscussed, ourstartinghypothesisisthatruggednesshasadirectnegativeeffecton
current income because it increases the costs of cultivation, building, and trade. This relationship
can be written
yi = k1   ari + bqi + ei , (1)
where i indexes countries, yi is income per capita, ri is our measure of ruggedness, qi is a measure
ofthe efﬁciencyorquality ofthe organizationofsociety, k1, a and b areconstants (a > 0and b > 0),
and ei is a classical error term (i.e., we assume that ei is independent and identically distributed,
drawn from a normal distribution, with a conditional expectation of zero).
Historical studies and the empirical work of Nunn (2008) have documented that Africa’s slave
trades adversely affected the political and social structures of societies. We capture this effect of
Africa’s slave trades with the following equation
qi =
(
k2   gxi + ui if i is in Africa,
ui otherwise,
(2)
where xi denotes slave exports, k2 and g are constants (g > 0), and ui is a classical error term.
Historical accounts argue that the number of slaves taken from an area was reduced by the
ruggedness of the terrain. This relationship is given by
xi = k3   lri + vi , (3)
where k2 and l are constants (l > 0), and vi is a classical error term.
Equations (1), (2) and (3) are the core relationships in our analysis. Our ﬁrst approach is to
combine all three by substituting, which gives
yi =
(
k1   ari + bglri + k4 + zi + xi if i is in Africa,
k1   ari + zi otherwise,
(4)
where k4  b(k2   gk3), zi  ei + bui and xi   bgvi. Equation (4) summarizes the relationships
between ruggedness, the slave trades, and current income. It illustrates the core hypothesis of
the paper: that for non-African countries, the relationship between ruggedness and income only
includes a negative direct effect  a, but for African countries, in addition to the negative direct
effect  a, there is also a positive indirect effect bgl.
Guided by equation (4), we estimate the following relationship between ruggedness and in-
come:
yi = b0 + b1ri + b2riIAfrica
i + b3IAfrica
i + #i , (5)
which is a more compact version of (4), using an indicator variable IAfrica
i that equals 1 if i is in
Africa and 0 otherwise.
We also estimate a restricted version of equation (5) that forces the ruggedness-income relation-
ship to be the same for all countries.
yi = b4 + b5ri + #i . (6)
5Our predictions about the relationships between ruggedness, the slave trades, and income yield
the following hypotheses for the estimates of (5) and (6):
Hypothesis 1. b1 < 0 (ruggedness has a direct negative effect on income).
Hypothesis 2. b2 > 0 (in Africa ruggedness has an additional positive effect).
Hypothesis 3. b1 < b5 (not accounting for hypothesis 2 biases the direct effect towards zero).
The ﬁrst hypothesis, captured by the sign of b1, is that ruggedness has a direct negative effect on
income. The second hypothesis, which is core to our paper, is that in Africa ruggedness has an
additional positive effect on income. The third hypothesis compares the estimated direct effects of
ruggedness in the unrestricted and restricted equations. We expect that, since b5 captures both the
direct and indirect effects of ruggedness, it will be an upwards biased estimate of  a, whereas b1
will be a consistent estimate of  a. From this it follows that b5 is greater than b1. The following
section tests whether the data supports these three hypotheses.7
Wehaveassumedthroughoutthattheconditionalexpectationofeachoftheerrortermsinequa-
tions (1)–(3) is equal to zero. In this case, estimating equation (5) provides a consistent estimate of
the direct and indirect effect of ruggedness. In practice, our assumptions rely on there not being
variables that belong in any of the structural equations (1)–(3), but are omitted from our reduced
form estimating equation (5). More speciﬁcally, our main coefﬁcient of interest is b2 in equation (5),
which measures the differential effect of ruggedness for Africa. In order for an omitted variable to
bias this estimate, it must be the case that, either the relationship between income and the omitted
factor is different inside and outside of Africa, or that the relationship between the omitted factor
and ruggedness is different inside and outside of Africa. For this reason, in our empirical analysis,
we pay particular attention to identifying and including potentially omitted factors for which the
relationship with either income or ruggedness is potentially different inside and outside of Africa.
Equation (5) illustrates the relationship between income and ruggedness, leaving slave exports
in the background. Recall that we arrived at this equation by substituting both (3) and (2) into (1).
In section 5 we bring slave exports to the foreground by instead only substituting (2) into (1) and
estimating (3) separately. This gives us a relationship between income and both ruggedness (now
only incorporating its direct effect) and slave exports:
yi =
(
k1   ari + bk2   bgxi + zi if i is in Africa,
k1   ari + zi otherwise.
(7)
Wetestthisrelationshipand(3)byestimatingthefollowingequations(notethatforallnon-African
countries slave exports are zero, xi = 0):
yi = b6 + b7ri + b8riIAfrica
i + b9IAfrica
i + b10xi + #i , (8)
xi = b11 + b12ri + e . (9)
Estimating (8) and (9) allows us to test four additional hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4. b12 < 0 (ruggedness negatively affects slave exports).
7We have implicitly assumed that b2 is the same for all African countries. In section 4 we relax this assumption and
allow the indirect effect of ruggedness to differ across the regions of Africa.
6Hypothesis 5. b10 < 0 (slave exports negatively affect income).
Hypothesis 6. b8 = 0 (once slave exports are taken into account, the effect of ruggedness is no
different in Africa).
Hypothesis 7. b7 < 0 (once slave exports are taken into account, the effect of ruggedness is
negative).
Hypothesis4and5arethatruggednessdeterredslaveexportsandthatslaveexportsarenegatively
related to current income. Hypothesis 6 provides a way of testing whether the slave trades can
fully account for the positive indirect effect of ruggedness within Africa. If the ruggedness-income
relationship is different for Africa only because of the slave trades, then once we control for the
effect of the slave trades on income, there should no longer be a differential effect of ruggedness
for Africa. Hypothesis 7 is that once the indirect effect of ruggedness is taken into account by
controlling for the slave trades, the direct effect of ruggedness can be correctly identiﬁed and
should be negative.
While we have been able to obtain a good estimate of xi in order to estimate equation (3)
separately from (1) and (2), obtaining an appropriate estimate of qi in order to also estimate (1)
and (2) separately from each other is more difﬁcult. This is because we expect slave exports to
negatively affect current income levels through a variety of channels, many of which are difﬁcult
to measure empirically. Nevertheless, as a ﬁnal step in our empirical strategy, we use the “rule of
law” variable from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators database (Kaufmann, Kraay,
and Mastruzzi, 2008) as a proxy for qi to estimate equations (1) and (2) separately. This allows
us to trace the three steps that together produce the differential effect of ruggedness in Africa:
ruggedness deterred slave exports, which in turn have negatively affected domestic institutions
and the functioning of societies, which in turn are important determinants of per capita income.
4. The direct and indirect effects of ruggedness
As a ﬁrst step in our empirical analysis, we now estimate the common effect of ruggedness on
income per person and its differential effect for Africa. Our baseline estimates of equation (5)
are given in table 1. Looking ﬁrst at column (1), when we estimate equation (5) by regressing
income per person on ruggedness while allowing for a differential effect in African countries, we
ﬁnd empirical conﬁrmation for hypotheses 1 and 2. The coefﬁcient for ruggedness is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant (i.e., b1 < 0 in equation (5)), while the coefﬁcient for ruggedness interacted
with an indicator variable for Africa is positive and statistically signiﬁcant (i.e., b2 > 0 in equation
(5), as stated in hypothesis 2). As well, the magnitude of the indirect effect of ruggedness is
larger than the direct effect of ruggedness. This suggests that for this geographic characteristic
the indirect historic effect on income is at least as large as the direct contemporaneous effect.8
If we estimate the same equation, but restrict the effect of ruggedness on income to be the same
forAfricanandnon-Africancountries, thenweestimateasmallnegativecoefﬁcientforruggedness
8We discuss the economic magnitudes of these effects in section 5.
7Table 1: The direct and indirect effects of ruggedness
Dependent variable: Log real gdp per person 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ruggedness -0.203 -0.196 -0.203 -0.243 -0.193 -0.231
(0.093) (0.094) (0.078) (0.092) (0.074) (0.077)
Ruggedness IAfrica 0.393 0.404 0.406 0.414 0.302 0.321
(0.144) (0.146) (0.132) (0.157) (0.130) (0.127)
IAfrica -1.948 -2.014 -1.707 -2.066 -1.615 -1.562
(0.220) (0.222) (0.327) (0.324) (0.300) (0.415)
Diamonds 0.017 0.028
(0.012) (0.010)
Diamonds IAfrica -0.014 -0.026
(0.012) (0.011)
% Fertile soil 0.000 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
% Fertile soil IAfrica -0.008 -0.009
(0.007) (0.007)
% Tropical climate -0.007 -0.009
(0.002) (0.002)
% Tropical climate IAfrica 0.004 0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
Distance to coast -0.657 -1.039
(0.190) (0.193)
Distance to coast IAfrica -0.291 -0.194
(0.427) (0.386)
Constant 9.223 9.204 9.221 9.514 9.388 9.959
(0.143) (0.148) (0.194) (0.164) (0.142) (0.195)
Observations 170 170 170 170 170 170
R2 0.357 0.367 0.363 0.405 0.421 0.537
Notes: Coefﬁcients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. , , and  indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent levels.
that is not signiﬁcantly different from zero (coefﬁcient  0.067 with standard error 0.082). This is
consistent with hypothesis 3. The negative direct effect of ruggedness is biased upwards (i.e.,
towards zero) when the positive effect of ruggedness within Africa is not taken into account (i.e.,
b5 in equation (6) is greater than b1 in equation (5), as stated in hypothesis 3).9
Robustness with respect to omitted geographical variables
When interpreting our core results regarding the relationship between ruggedness and current
economic outcomes, a possible source of concern is that the estimated differential effect of rug-
gedness within Africa may be driven, at least in part, by other geographical features. However,
for an omitted variable to bias our estimated differential effect, it is not enough that the omitted
variable is correlated with income and ruggedness. It must be the case that, either the relationship
between the omitted factor and income is different within and outside of Africa, or the relationship
9This speciﬁcation includes the Africa indicator variable. If this is also removed, the estimated ruggedness coefﬁcient
is 0.003 and the standard error is 0.082.
8between the omitted factor and ruggedness is different within and outside of Africa. Thus, to deal
with potentially omitted differential effects, we include in our baseline speciﬁcation of column
(1) both the control variable and an interaction of the control variable with our Africa indicator
variable. By doing this we allow the effect of the control variable to differ for Africa.
A potentially confounding factor, which may have differential effects within and outside of
Africa, is the curse of mineral resources (Sachs and Warner, 2001, Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik,
2006). If diamond deposits are correlated with ruggedness, and diamond production increases
income outside of Africa, but decreases income within Africa because of poor institutions, then
this could potentially bias the estimated differential effect of ruggedness.10 Column (2) adds
to our baseline speciﬁcation of column (1) a control variable measuring carats of gem-quality
diamond extracted per square kilometre 1958–2000 (see the appendix for details of how this and
other geographical controls are constructed) as well as an interaction of this control with the Africa
indicator variable. This provides weak evidence that the effect of diamonds is positive in general,
but that for African countries there is a differential negative effect that nearly wipes out the general
positive effect (however, neither effect is statistically signiﬁcant). The inclusion of this control
variable and its interaction with the Africa indicator variable does not alter our results regarding
therelationshipbetweenruggednessandcurrenteconomicoutcomes. Wehavealsotriedincluding
measures of other mineral resources, oil reserves and gold in particular, again together with an
African interaction term, but found no signiﬁcant effects.
It is also possible that in general rugged areas have worse soil quality, but within Africa rugged
areas have better soil quality. For example, the Rift Valley region of Africa is rugged but has
very fertile soil. To control for this possibility, we construct a measure of the percentage of fertile
soil in each country. This is deﬁned as soil that is not subject to severe constraints for growing
rain-fed crops in terms of either soil fertility, depth, chemical and drainage properties, or moisture
storage capacity, and is based on the fao/unesco Digital Soil Map of the World. In column (3),
we add the measure of soil fertility and its interaction with the Africa indicator variable to our
baseline speciﬁcation. The results show that the differential effect of ruggedness remains robust to
controlling for soil quality.
A related argument can be made about tropical diseases. If rugged areas are less prone to
tropical diseases within Africa but not in the rest of the world, then this could potentially bias the
estimated differential effect of ruggedness. To check for this possibility, in column (4) we add to
our baseline speciﬁcation a variable measuring the percentage of each country that has any of the
four tropical climates in the Köppen-Geiger climate classiﬁcation, as well as an interaction of this
variable with the Africa indicator variable. We see that there is a statistically signiﬁcant negative
relationship between tropical climate and income, but that the effect is no different for African
countries. Our core results are, once again, unchanged.11
10See Mehlum et al. (2006) and Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2006) for theory and empirical evidence supporting
such a differential effect of resource endowments.
11If instead of looking at tropical diseases in general, we focus on malaria in particular by including an index of
the stability of malaria transmission from Kiszewski, Mellinger, Spielman, Malaney, Sachs, and Sachs (2004) and the
corresponding African interaction, our core results are also unchanged. The same is true if we include distance to the
equator and the corresponding African interaction.
9Table 2: Differential effect of ruggedness for Africa, alternative income and ruggedness measures
Dependent variable:
Log real gdp Log real gdp Log real gdp Average log real
per person per person per person gdp per person
2000 2000 1950 1950–2000



















Ruggedness 0.321 0.250 0.284 0.284
(0.127) (0.113) (0.129) (0.123)
Average slope 0.098 0.076 0.083 0.084
(0.044) (0.040) (0.047) (0.045)
Local std. dev. of elevation 1.105 0.835 0.919 0.922
(0.459) (0.414) (0.460) (0.443)
% highly rugged land 0.017 0.014 0.017 0.017
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Pop.-weighted ruggedness 0.726 0.664 0.393 0.531
(0.220) (0.206) (0.192) (0.190)
Observations 170 159 137 137
Notes: Each entry of the table reports the coefﬁcient and robust standard errors for Ruggedness IAfrica from the
speciﬁcation of column (6) in table 1, estimated using an alternative income measure as the dependent variable and an
alternative measure of ruggedness. The alternative income measure is reported above the corresponding column, and
the alternative ruggedness measure is reported to the left of the corresponding row. , , and  indicate signiﬁcance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
Motivated by the arguments of Rappaport and Sachs (2003) and others that coastal access is a
fundamental determinant of income differences, in column (5) we control for the average distance
(measured in thousands of kilometres) to the nearest ice-free coast for each country. As before,
we also include an interaction of the distance variable with the African indicator variable. Our
results remain robust. Finally, in column (6) we include all of the geographic controls and their
corresponding interaction terms. We ﬁnd again that our baseline results from column (1) are robust
to controlling for other geographic characteristics that could have a differential effect in Africa.12
Robustness with respect to alternative income and ruggedness measures
We next consider a number of sensitivity checks to ensure that the ﬁndings documented to this
point are in fact robust. First, one can think of many alternative measures of ruggedness. We
have chosen to use a well-established measure of terrain ruggedness that was developed Riley
et al. (1999) to quantify topographic heterogeneity that creates hiding places and outlook posts in
wildlife habitats. The ﬁrst robustness check that we perform is to check that our results hold with
other measures of ruggedness. An obvious alternative measure of ruggedness is the average slope
of the terrain. Thus, using the same gtopo30 elevation data, we calculate the average uphill slope
of the country’s surface area. For every point on the 30 arc-seconds grid, we calculate the absolute
12Of independent interest is the relationship between ruggedness and our set of control variables. We do not ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant relationship between ruggedness and either diamond production, soil fertility, or distance from the coast. We
do ﬁnd a negative relationship between ruggedness and the fraction of a country that has a tropical climate. As well,
we do not ﬁnd Africa to be signiﬁcantly more or less rugged than the rest of the world. See table 8 for details.
10value of the slope between the point and the eight adjacent points. The absolute values of the eight
slopes are then averaged to calculate the mean uphill slope for each 30 by 30 arc-second cell. We
then average across all grid cells in a country not covered by water to obtain the average uphill
slope of the country’s land area.13
Of course, there are many other ways to measure differences in elevation within short distances.
We also calculate the standard deviation of elevation within the same eight-cell neighbourhood
used to calculate the terrain ruggedness index and slope, and then average this across all cells
within each country.
It is possible that what matters is having a large enough amount of sufﬁciently rugged terrain
nearby, even if some portions of the country are fairly ﬂat. To capture this logic, we calculate the
percentage of a country’s land area that is highly rugged (with a threshold set at 240 metres for
the terrain ruggedness index calculated on the 30 arc-seconds grid, below which Riley et al., 1999
classify terrain as being ‘level’ to ‘intermediately rugged’).
All of these measures of ruggedness treat all land in the country uniformly when averaging
over cells to construct country averages. Thus, they do not capture the possibility that ruggedness
may be more important (and thus should be given more weight) in areas that are more densely
populated today. To check that our results are not sensitive to this characteristic of our terrain
ruggedness measure, we construct an alternative, population-weighted measure of ruggedness.
We start by calculating the ruggedness of each 30 by 30 arc-second cell but, in averaging this for
each country, we weight ruggedness in each cell by the share of the country’s population located in
that cell. The population data are for 2000 and are from the LandScan data set (Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, 2001).14
The other robustness check that we perform is a test of whether our results are robust when we
consider income from other time periods. When looking at time periods earlier than 2000, we turn
to data from Maddison (2007), which has much better historic coverage than the World Bank. In
2000, Maddison only has data for 159 countries, compared to 170 for the World Bank. But once
one starts to move back in time, Maddison’s coverage is much better than the World Bank’s. For
example, prior to 1980 the World Bank does not have data on real per capita ppp-adjusted gdp.
Maddison has data for 137 countries as far back as back to 1950. We ﬁnd that our results are robust
using income from any year between 1950 and 2000. We report robustness checks using the natural
logarithm of real gross domestic product per person in 1950 and in 2000, and its average (based on
annual data) between 1950 and 2000, with Maddison’s data.
We summarize the results from this barrage of robustness checks in table 2. Each cell reports
the coefﬁcient of Ruggedness IAfrica from our baseline estimating equation (5), with our full set of
controls included (i.e., the speciﬁcation in column (6) in table 1). In total, we report 20 coefﬁcients
from 20 different regressions, each using a different combination of the available measures of
13Again, our calculations take into account the latitude-varying sea-level surface that corresponds to the 30 by 30
arc-second cell centred on each point.
14We prefer our baseline measure to this alternative measure because it is fully exogenous. In addition, our estimation
strategy requires using a common measure to estimate the direct contemporaneous and indirect historical effects of
ruggedness, and it is not clear that a measure based on current population weights is appropriate for the historical
channel.
11Table 3: Robustness with respect to inﬂuential observations
Dependent variable: Log real gdp per person 2000
Omit 10 Omit 10 Omit if Using Box-Cox Trans.
most rugged smallest jdfbetaj > 2/
p
N ln(Ruggedness) of Ruggedness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ruggedness -0.202 -0.221 -0.261 -0.171 -0.249
(0.083) (0.083) (0.068) (0.051) (0.075)
Ruggedness IAfrica 0.286 0.188 0.223 0.234 0.333
(0.133) (0.099) (0.116) (0.119) (0.142)
IAfrica -1.448 -1.465 -1.510 -1.083 -1.139
(0.454) (0.405) (0.406) (0.394) (0.391)
Diamonds 0.073 0.029 0.026 0.029 0.027
(0.031) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Diamonds IAfrica -0.071 -0.027 -0.024 -0.027 -0.025
(0.031) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
% Fertile soil -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
% Fertile soil IAfrica -0.010 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
% Tropical climate -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Tropical climate IAfrica 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Distance to coast -1.064 -1.015 -1.023 -1.052 -1.058
(0.208) (0.197) (0.192) (0.206) (0.199)
Distance to coast IAfrica -0.185 -0.180 -0.176 -0.216 -0.191
(0.400) (0.395) (0.397) (0.383) (0.383)
Constant 9.898 9.936 9.989 9.631 9.665
(0.206) (0.212) (0.188) (0.197) (0.193)
Observations 160 160 164 170 170
R2 0.520 0.545 0.564 0.527 0.533
Notes: Coefﬁcients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. , , and  indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent levels.
income and ruggedness. The estimated positive differential effect of ruggedness is very robust. In
fact, in all 20 regressions, we ﬁnd that the differential effect of ruggedness within Africa is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant.
Robustness with respect to inﬂuential observations
Next, we check whether the results from table 1 are driven by some particularly inﬂuential outliers.
Figure 2 shows a scatter plot of income per person against ruggedness for African countries (top
panel) and non-African countries (bottom panel). In these plots of the raw data, one observes a
positive relationship for African countries and a negative relationship for non-African countries.
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(coef. = −.203, t−stat. = −2.20, N = 121)
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Non−African Countries
Figure 3: Income and ruggedness (Box-Cox transformed) among African and non-African coun-
tries
14sensitivity check estimates our baseline speciﬁcation, with our full set of control variables, after
dropping the ten most rugged countries. The results are presented in column (1) of table 3.
In the scatter plot, one can also observe that small countries (based on land area) tend to
have either unusually high (e.g., Seychelles, identiﬁed in the ﬁgure by its iso 3166-1 code syc)
or unusually low ruggedness (e.g., Saint Kitts and Nevis, kna). Given this, we perform a second
robustness check where the ten smallest countries are omitted from the sample. The estimates are
reported in column (2) of table 3.15
We next adopt a more systematic approach to deal with inﬂuential observations, and remove
inﬂuential observations using each observation’s dfbeta, which is a measure of the difference in
the estimated coefﬁcient for the ruggedness interaction (scaled by the standard error) when the
observation is included and when it is excluded from the sample. Following Belsley, Kuh, and
Welsch (1980), we omit all observations for which jdfbetaij > 2/
p
N, where N is the number of
observations, in our case 170.16 Results are presented in column (3) of table 3.
In all three of the regressions with omitted observations, the ruggedness coefﬁcient remains
negative and statistically signiﬁcant, and the ruggedness interaction remains positive and statist-
ically signiﬁcant, conﬁrming the existence of a differential effect of ruggedness within Africa.
The reason why, in ﬁgure 2, a small number of observations appear as particularly inﬂuential
is because the ruggedness measure is skewed to the left, leaving a small number of observations
with large values. We remedy this in two ways. First, we take the natural log of ruggedness and
use this in the estimating equations. This draws in the outlying observations in the regression.
The estimates of interest, reported in column (4), remain robust to this transformation. However,
looking at the natural log of ruggedness variable, one ﬁnds that the measure is no longer left
skewed, but it is now right skewed, with a small number of inﬂuential observations taking on very
small values. Because of this, we pursue a second strategy where we perform a zero-skewness Box-
Cox power transformation on the ruggedness variable to obtain a measure with zero skewness.
The relationships between income and the zero-skewness ruggedness measure are shown in ﬁgure
3. It is evident that the income-ruggedness relationships using the zero-skewness measure do not
feature inﬂuential, outlying observations. In addition, a different relationship within Africa and
outside of Africa is still apparent in the scatter plots of the data. Estimates using the zero-skewness
measure are reported in column (5). The estimates conﬁrm the impression given by the ﬁgures.
There is a positive and signiﬁcant differential effect of ruggedness within Africa.
Do other African characteristics or colonial rule explain the differential effect of ruggedness?
A ﬁnal possible source of concern is that the differential effect of ruggedness for Africa is not
really an African effect. Perhaps it arises because the effect of ruggedness on income differs for
areas with some geographic characteristic that happens to be particularly prevalent in Africa. For
15A related concern is that our results may be driven by “atypical” African countries, such as island countries or
North African countries. Our results are also robust to omitting these “atypical” African countries from the sample.
16Usingothermeasuresandrulesfortheomissionofinﬂuentialobservations, suchasdﬁts, Cook’sdistanceorWelsch
distance, provide very similar results.
15Table 4: Considering differential effects of ruggedness by characteristics prevalent in Africa
Dependent variable: Log real gdp per person 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ruggedness -0.259 -0.322 -0.374 -0.386 -0.543
(0.101) (0.160) (0.161) (0.176) (0.179)
Ruggedness IAfrica 0.357 0.400 0.360 0.399 0.435
(0.130) (0.155) (0.140) (0.203) (0.135)
IAfrica -1.814 -1.977 -1.818 -1.740 -1.994
(0.213) (0.223) (0.218) (0.337) (0.216)
Ruggedness  % Tropical cl. 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Tropical climate -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.010
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ruggedness  % Fertile soil 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
% Fertile soil -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Ruggedness IBritish col. orig. -0.089
(0.244)
IBritish col. orig. 0.062
(0.379)
Ruggedness IFrench col. orig. -0.108
(0.244)
IFrench col. orig. -0.175
(0.511)
Ruggedness IPortuguese col. orig. 0.361
(0.259)
IPortuguese col. orig. -0.393
(0.467)
Ruggedness ISpanish col. orig. -0.105
(0.334)
ISpanish col. orig. 0.004
(0.538)
Ruggedness IOther European col. orig. -0.234
(0.328)
IOther European col. orig. -0.703
(0.519)
IFrench civil law -0.154
(0.222)




Ruggedness ISocialist law 0.194
(0.150)
IGerman civil law -0.087
(0.302)




Ruggedness IScandinavian law 0.666
(0.174)
Constant 9.505 9.427 9.627 9.681 9.946
(0.168) (0.213) (0.223) (0.306) (0.232)
Observations 170 170 170 170 170
R2 0.404 0.363 0.408 0.430 0.559
Notes: Coefﬁcients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. , , and  indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent levels.
16instance, it could be that in countries where a large fraction of the territory experiences tropical
climates, rugged areas are cooler, dryer, or even less prone to tropical diseases. If tropical climates
are particularly prevalent in Africa (they characterize 34.0% of land in Africa compared with 19.3%
of the rest of the world excluding Antarctica), perhaps the interaction between ruggedness and the
Africa indicator is proxying for an interaction between ruggedness and tropical climates. Similarly,
it could be that in countries where a large fraction of the territory is covered by dry unfertile
soil, like desert, rugged areas are less arid. If areas with poor soil are particularly prevalent in
Africa (fertile soil comprises 22.5% of the land in Africa compared with 25.3% in the rest of the
world excluding Antarctica), perhaps the interaction between ruggedness and the Africa indicator
is proxying for an interaction between ruggedness and poor soil quality.
We consider these possibilities in columns (1)–(3) of table 4, where we add to our baseline
estimating equation variables measuring the percentage of each country with tropical climates and
the percentage of each country with fertile soil (these can be seen as playing the same role as the
Africa indicator), as well as interactions between ruggedness and these two variables (these can be
seen as playing the same role as the interaction between ruggedness and the Africa indicator).17 In
columns (1) and (2) we include each of the two sets of controls one at a time, and in column (3) we
include them together. The coefﬁcients of interest, measuring the direct effect of ruggedness and
the differential effect for Africa, change little and remain statistically signiﬁcant.18
We next consider the possibility that our Africa indicator variable may be picking up the
prevalence of colonial rule. In areas that were colonized, rugged terrain may have provided a
way to defend against colonial rule. Since a greater proportion of countries in Africa, relative to
the rest of the world, experienced colonial rule (within Africa 89% of the countries were colonized,
while outside of Africa this ﬁgure is 44%), the differential effect of ruggedness in Africa may be
biased by a differential effect of ruggedness in countries that were colonized.
We control for this possibility in columns (4) and (5) of table 4. In column (4), we include
ﬁve indicator variables for the identity of a country’s colonizer, with the omitted category being
for countries that were not colonized.19 We also include the set of colonizer indicator variables
interacted with ruggedness. The differential effect of ruggedness remains positive and statistically
signiﬁcant.
Numerous studies have shown that differences in the legal origin of the colonizing powers is an
important determinant of a variety of country characteristics, including ﬁnancial development, la-
bour market regulations, contract enforcement, and economic growth (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer, 2008). Given the particular strong impact of colonial rule that works through legal
origin, we also control directly for each country’s legal origin, by including four legal origin
17The results are also robust if we use a measure of the proportion of a country’s land that is desert, rather than the
proportion with fertile soil.
18One could also think that certain countries, because of inferior access to technology or poor governance, are worse
equipped to mitigate the direct contemporaneous effect of ruggedness. However, note that this would work against
estimating a positive differential effect of ruggedness within Africa since access to technology and governance are likely
to be worse on average in Africa. A further concern is that the tropical climate measure is potentially endogenous to
ruggedness, since some areas may not be classiﬁed as tropical if they are rugged. A preferable measure would quantify
how tropical a climate would be if it were not rugged. Using a country’s distance from the equator as a proxy for this
measure yields very similar results.
19The ﬁve categories for the identity of the colonizer are: British, Portuguese, French, Spanish, and other European.
17indicator variables and their interactions ruggedness. The four indicators are for French, German,
Scandinavian, and Socialist legal origins, with the omitted category being British legal origin. The
positive differential effect of ruggedness remains when accounting for differences in countries’
legal origins.
Differential effects of ruggedness within Africa
One concern with the results presented to this point is that we only allow the effect of ruggedness
on economic outcomes to differ for African countries. We have also checked whether one also ﬁnds
a positive and statistically signiﬁcant differential effect of ruggedness within other parts of the
world. Treating other continents in the exact same manner that we have treated Africa in equation
(5) (including a continent indicator and an indicator interacted with ruggedness), we ﬁnd that for
no other continent is there a positive and statistically signiﬁcant differential effect of ruggedness.
In other words, the positive differential effect of ruggedness is unique to Africa, and is not found in
North America, South America, Europe, Asia, or Oceania.
Having determined that the differential effect of ruggedness is speciﬁc to the African continent,
we examine whether the strength of the effect differs across the regions within Africa in a manner
that is consistent with the known history of the slave trades. Our argument is that ruggedness has
a differential positive effect within Africa because no other continent was subject to the pressure of
the slave trades that devastated Africa between 1400 and 1900. However, the pressure of the slave
trades was not uniform across the continent. West Africa was the region most severely impacted by
the slave trade, whereas North Africa was barely touched.20 Thus, the logic of our core argument
suggests that ruggedness should have a more beneﬁcial effect within West Africa, where the threat
of being enslaved was greatest, but within North Africa, where the slave trade raiding was nearly
absent, the effect should be much smaller, and not very different from that in the rest of the world.
To check this, we examine the ﬁve regions of Africa deﬁned by Bratton and van de Walle (1997):
West Africa, Central Africa, North Africa, South Africa, and East Africa. We construct an indicator
variable for each region and then individually include each indicator variable and its interaction
with ruggedness in equation (5). The estimates are reported in table 5. The results show that
for West Africa and North Africa there is a statistically different effect of ruggedness relative to
the average for all of Africa. Within West Africa, the positive effect of ruggedness is signiﬁcantly
larger. This is consistent with the positive effect of ruggedness working through the slave trade,
and with West Africa being the region most severely impacted by the slave trade. In North Africa,
where slave capture was almost completely absent, there is no positive effect of ruggedness.21 The
results also show that the other three regions lie between these two extremes. For these regions,
20The correlation between our measure of slave exports, described in detail in the next section, and a West Africa
indicator variable is 0.53 and is statistically signiﬁcant. The correlation between slave exports and a North Africa
indicator variable is  0.30 and is also statistically signiﬁcant. For all other African regions, the correlation between
slave exports and a region indicator variable is not statistically different from zero.
21This is calculated by adding the coefﬁcient of the North Africa interaction to the coefﬁcient of the Africa interaction.
This gives: 0.406+  0.404 =  0.002.
18Table 5: Considering differential effects of ruggedness within Africa
Dependent variable: Log real gdp per person 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ruggedness -0.203 -0.203 -0.203 -0.203 -0.203
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093)
Ruggedness IAfrica 0.312 0.408 0.409 0.406 0.448
(0.159) (0.161) (0.147) (0.147) (0.179)
IAfrica -1.735 -1.844 -2.008 -2.046 -2.054
(0.291) (0.229) (0.230) (0.222) (0.232)




















Constant 9.223 9.223 9.223 9.223 9.223
(0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144)
Observations 170 170 170 170 170
R2 0.367 0.368 0.359 0.375 0.363
Notes: Coefﬁcients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. , , and  indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent levels.
19the positive differential effect of ruggedness is not statistically different from that for Africa as a
whole.
Our ﬁnding that, across regions within Africa, the magnitudes of the differential effects of the
ruggedness aligns closely with the intensity of the slave trades provides suggestive evidence of
that the differential effect of ruggedness within Africa is intimately linked to the slave trades. In
the following sections, we examine this directly, and provide additional evidence that this is in fact
the case.
5. Do slave exports account for Africa’s differential effect?
We now examine whether the slave trades can account for the differential effect of ruggedness
within Africa. Our ﬁrst step is to check for direct evidence that ruggedness provided protection
against slave raiding. We do this using data from Nunn (2008) on the number of slaves exported
from each country between 1400 and 1900 during Africa’s four slave trades. The data uses histor-
ical shipping records to calculate slave exports, as well as slave inventories, reporting slave ethni-
cities, to assign exports to the country where slaves where captured (see the appendix and Nunn,
2008, fordetails). Becausethevariableisveryskewedtotheleftandsomecountrieshavezeroslave
exports, we take the natural logarithm of one plus the measure, i.e. ln(1 + slave exports/area).
Using these data, we estimate equation (9) from section 3. Results are reported in columns (5)–(7)
of table 6.
Column (5) of table 6 reports the unconditional relationship between ruggedness and slave
exports among the 49 African countries in our sample. The estimate shows that there is a negative
and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between ruggedness and slave exports, and that rugged-
ness alone explains almost 30% of the variation in slave exports. This conﬁrms hypothesis 4 (i.e.,
b12 < 0 in equation (9)). In columns (6) and (7), we include additional variables to address several
potential concerns regarding the relationship between ruggedness and slave exports. We ﬁrst in-
clude our baseline set of control variables. Among the four controls, the fraction of fertile soil is the
only covariate that is statistically signiﬁcant. The positive coefﬁcient likely reﬂects that soil fertility
was an important determinant of having a dense and sedentary initial population, which may
have lead to more slaves being captured. In column (7), we include additional controls for other
factors that may be important determinants of slave exports. We control directly for log population
density in 1400. This is a particularly important characteristic, since it is possible that the reason
fewer slaves were taken from countries with greater terrain ruggedness is that there were fewer
people living in more rugged areas, and not because rugged terrain provided protection. The
variable is not statistically signiﬁcant. Since Nunn (2008) shows that slave exports are decreasing
in the distance from each country to the closest slave market in each of the four slave trades, we
also include these distances (measured in thousands of kilometres). The ruggedness coefﬁcient
remains negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level even after controlling for these additional factors.
Having established that rugged terrain deterred slave exports, we now turn to showing that
slave exports are negatively related to current economic outcomes and that this fully accounts for
the differential effect of ruggedness within Africa. In column (1) of table 6, we estimate equation
20Table 6: The impact and determinants of slave exports
Dep. variable: Dep. variable:
Log real gdp Slave export
per person 2000 intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Slave export intensity -0.203 -0.222 -0.206 -0.214
(0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.034)
Ruggedness -0.203 -0.169 -0.231 -0.220 -1.330 -1.326 -1.115
(0.093) (0.077) (0.077) (0.066) (0.262) (0.274) (0.381)
Ruggedness IAfrica 0.124 0.047
(0.152) (0.143)
IAfrica -0.819 -0.591 -0.825 -0.728
(0.317) (0.222) (0.356) (0.354)
Diamonds 0.028 0.028 -0.005 -0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007)
Diamonds IAfrica -0.027 -0.027
(0.010) (0.010)
% Fertile soil -0.002 -0.002 0.042 0.039
(0.003) (0.003) (0.015) (0.021)
% Fertile soil IAfrica 0.000 0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
% Tropical climate -0.009 -0.009 0.013 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.012)
% Tropical climate IAfrica 0.009 0.008
(0.003) (0.003)
Distance to coast -1.039 -1.039 0.154 -1.702
(0.194) (0.194) (1.174) (1.665)
Distance to coast IAfrica -0.162 -0.191
(0.321) (0.343)
Log pop. density 1400 0.289
(0.889)
Dist. Saharan slave market -1.763
(1.013)
Dist. Atlantic slave market -1.005
(0.498)
Dist. Red Sea slave market -0.199
(0.700)
Dist. Indian slave market -0.923
(0.497)
Constant 9.223 9.175 9.959 9.943 5.572 3.575 25.050
(0.144) (0.127) (0.195) (0.195) (0.503) (1.251) (10.186)
Observations 170 170 170 170 49 49 49
R2 0.418 0.415 0.586 0.585 0.289 0.448 0.552
Notes: Coefﬁcients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. , , and  indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent levels.
21(8) from section 3. This is identical to equation (5) (for which we reported estimates in column
(1) of table 1), except that slave exports are also included in the estimating equation. Column (3)
reports the same estimation as column (1) except that we also include our baseline set of control
variables from section 4 in the estimating equation. With or without the full set of controls, when
slave exports are controlled for the differential effect of ruggedness within Africa disappears. The
estimated coefﬁcient on ruggedness IAfrica is close to zero, and is no longer statistically signiﬁcant.
This conﬁrms hypothesis 6 (i.e., b8 = 0 in equation (8)), and provides support for the explanation
that the differential effect of ruggedness arises because of the slave trades.
In columns (2) and (4), we re-estimate the speciﬁcations of, respectively, columns (1) and (3),
leaving out the interaction between ruggedness and the Africa indicator variable. This conﬁrms
hypothesis 5, which formalizes the argument that current economic outcomes in Africa are worse
in places more affected by the slave trades (i.e., b10 < 0 in equation (8)). We have already shown
that once slave exports are taken into account the effect of ruggedness is no different within Africa
than elsewhere (hypothesis 6). We can also see in columns (2) and (4) that this common effect, once
slave exports are accounted for, is negative, which conﬁrms hypothesis 7 (i.e., b7 < 0 in equation
(8)).
The estimates from table 6 can be used to calculate an alternative estimate of the indirect historic
effect of ruggedness on income. The coefﬁcients for slave export intensity from columns (1) and
(3) provide estimates of the effect of slave exports on income, i.e., bg from equation (7). The coef-
ﬁcients for ruggedness from columns (5)–(7) provide estimates of l from equation (1). Therefore,
the product of the two coefﬁcients provides an alternative estimate of the indirect historic effect of
ruggedness bgl. Becausethisisadirectestimateoftheeffectofruggednessthatworksthroughthe
slave trades, it is potentially more precise than our reduced form estimate (i.e., b2 from equation
(5)), which is based solely on the differential effect of ruggedness within Africa.
Consider the estimates with our baseline set of control variables, reported in columns (4) and
(6). They give c bg =  0.206 and ˆ l =  1.326. Therefore, c bgˆ l =  0.206   1.326 = 0.273. We
can compare this estimate to our reduced-form estimate reported in column (6) of table 1, which
is 0.321. The indirect effect of ruggedness working through slave exports is almost identical to the
reduced-form differential effect of ruggedness within Africa estimated in section 4. This provides
reassuring conﬁrmation that the reduced form differential effect of ruggedness within Africa is in
fact being driven by the historic effect of ruggedness on Africa’s slave trades.
Economic magnitude of the effects
To this point we have been focusing on the statistical signiﬁcance of our estimated coefﬁcients,
ignoring the magnitude of their effects. Using the estimates from table 6, we now undertake
a number of counterfactual calculations to show that the economic magnitudes of the indirect
historic impact of ruggedness, working through the slave trades, is substantial.
We ﬁrst consider the estimated magnitude of the impact of the slave trades on income. For
context, consider a hypothetical African country with the mean level of slave exports and mean
log real gdp per person among African countries. According to the estimates from column (3) of
22table 6, if this country was instead completely untouched by the slave trades, then its per capita
income would increase by $2,365, from $1,784 to $4,149.22
We next consider the magnitude of the historic beneﬁt of ruggedness, which occurs through
reduced slave exports. Consider the beneﬁt of a one standard deviation increase in ruggedness
from the average of 1.110 to 2.389. According to the estimates from column (6) of table 6, this
reduces slave exports by 1.326  1.279 = 1.70, which is a 0.54 standard deviation decline in slave
export intensity. This in turn increases log real gdp per person by $747, from the average $1,784 to
$2,531, which is a 0.37 standard deviation increase in log income per person.23
These effects are substantial, particularly given that we are considering the historic impact of
one very speciﬁc geographic characteristic — terrain ruggedness — working through one historic
event — the slave trades.
The effect of slave exports on income through rule of law
We have so far estimated the indirect effect of ruggedness on income, bgl, in two ways. First,
by estimating the reduced-form relationship between income and ruggedness from equation (4)
to obtain the combined differential effect of ruggedness within Africa d bgl. Second, by estimating
separately the effect of ruggedness on slave exports from equation (1) to obtain ˆ l and the effect of
slave exports on income of equation (7) to obtain c bg. A third alternative is to estimate the three
equations (1)–(3) separately to obtain ˆ l, ˆ b, and ˆ g independently. One problem with this third
alternative is that it is difﬁcult to obtain an appropriate measure for qi, which summarizes the
different aspects of the organization of societies that are negatively affected by the slave trades. As
a partial step in this direction, we use the “rule of law” variable from the World Bank’s Worldwide
Governance Indicators database (Kaufmann et al., 2008). Estimates of equations (1) and (2) using this
variable are reported in table 7.
The ﬁrst two columns of the table report estimates of equation (1), which captures the effects of
institutional quality, as proxied by the rule of law, on real per capita income in 2000. In column (1),
we control for the Africa indicator variable only, and in column (2) we also control for our standard
set of control variables and their interactions with the Africa indicator variable. The estimates
show a strong negative, and statistically signiﬁcant, relationship between the rule of law and per
capita income. This result conﬁrms the ﬁndings from a number of previous studies that stress the
importance of governance and domestic institutions for long-term economic development (e.g.,
Acemoglu et al., 2001).
Columns (3)–(5) of table 7 report estimates of equation (2), which models the relationship
between slave exports and the quality of the organization of societies. The estimates of column
22This is calculated from: lny0 = ln1,784   0.206  ( 4.09), where 4.09 is the mean slave export intensity measure
among African countries (given in table 8),  0.206 is the estimated impact of slave exports on income (from column
(3) of table 6), and y0 denotes the counterfactual income, had the slave trades not occurred in the hypothetical country.
Solving for y0 gives $4,149.
23This is calculated from: lny0 = ln1,784   0.206  ( 1.326  1.279), where 1.279 is the standard deviation of
ruggedness among African countries (given in table 8),  1.326 is the estimated impact of ruggedness on slave exports
(from column (6) of table 6), and  0.206 is the estimated impact of slave exports on income (from column (3) of table 6).
Solving for y0 gives $2,531.
23Table 7: The effect of slave exports on income through rule of law
Dep. variable: Dep. variable:
Log real gdp Rule of
per person 2000 law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




IAfrica -0.699 -0.109 -0.509 -1.001 -1.104
(0.131) (0.352) (0.188) (0.289) (0.346)
Slave export intensity -0.086 -0.065 -0.065
(0.031) (0.033) (0.034)
Diamonds 0.009 0.034 0.025
(0.014) (0.008) (0.007)
Diamonds IAfrica -0.009 -0.033 -0.023
(0.015) (0.008) (0.007)
% Fertile soil 0.000 -0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
% Fertile soil IAfrica -0.015 0.010 0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
% Tropical climate -0.002 -0.009 -0.011
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
% Tropical climate IAfrica 0.003 0.004 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Distance to coast -0.221 -0.995 -0.438
(0.174) (0.195) (0.174)
Distance to coast IAfrica -0.576 0.364 -0.197
(0.347) (0.294) (0.283)
IFrench civil law -0.554
(0.167)








Constant 8.783 8.922 0.218 0.900 1.035
(0.076) (0.159) (0.087) (0.195) (0.218)
Observations 169 169 169 169 169
R2 0.746 0.776 0.191 0.423 0.616
Notes: Coefﬁcients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. , , and  indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent levels.
24(3) control for the Africa indicator variable only. We include the Africa indicator to ensure that
our estimated effect of slave exports on institutional quality is not estimated from the difference
between Africa and the rest of the world. Because slave exports are zero for all countries outside of
Africa, and because we always control for an Africa ﬁxed effect, the estimated coefﬁcient for slave
exports is estimated from the relationship between slave exports and institutional quality within
Africa only. In columns (4) and (5), we include additional control variables. We ﬁrst include our
baseline set of control variables and their interactions with the Africa indicator variable. Then, in
column(5), wealsoaddourlegaloriginﬁxedeffectsandtheirinteractionswiththeAfricaindicator
variable.24 The estimates provide strong support for the slave trade adversely affecting domestic
institutions today. The coefﬁcient for slave exports is negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
Combining the estimated coefﬁcients ˆ l =  1.326 from column (6) of table 6, ˆ b = 0.813 from
column (2) of table 7, and ˆ g =  0.065 from column (4) of table 7 yields ˆ l  ˆ b  ˆ g = 0.070.
Like the reduced-form estimate from column (6) of table 1, the indirect effect of ruggedness is
found to be positive. However, the magnitude from the structural estimates is just under one
fourth of the magnitude implied by the reduced-form estimate. This occurs because our structural
estimates implicitly assume that the only effect of slave exports on income is through the rule
of law. Any effect of the slave trade on per capita income that does not occur through our
measured rule of law will not be captured when we estimate b and g individually. This is not true
however, for our estimate of the relationship between slave exports and income, c bg =  0.206.
The relationship between slave exports and income implied by the individual estimates of b and
g is ˆ b  ˆ g = 0.813   0.065 =  0.053. The difference between the two estimated magnitudes
is consistent with the slave trade affecting income through channels other than the rule of law.
Exploring such channels is the subject of ongoing research. For instance, the recent results of
Nunn and Wantchekon (2008), which show that the slave trades had a negative effect on levels of
trust 100 year after the end of the trade, provide evidence that the slave trades likely affect current
income levels through a variety of additional channels other than the rule of law.
6. Conclusions
This paper contributes to the ongoing controversy about whether geography matters mainly be-
cause of its direct contemporaneous impact on economic outcomes or because of its interaction
with historical events. The issue is not just a matter of intellectual curiosity. It is important
for development policies, and has been the source of much recent debate. Researchers such as
Jeffrey Sachs (2005) and others, who believe that geography matters primarily through a direct
contemporaneous channel, argue that foreign aid and investment are needed to overcome the
adverse geographic environments of poor countries. According to this view, with enough foreign
24Because our regression includes an Africa indicator variable, a full set of legal origin indicator variables, and interac-
tions between them, non-African British common law countries constitute the omitted baseline category. Therefore, the
differential effect (relative to this baseline) of the other legal origins for non-African countries is given by the coefﬁcients
of the legal origin indicator variables, while the differential effect of the other legal origins for African countries is given
by the interaction of the legal origin indicators with the Africa indicator variable. Because African countries are only of
either British or French legal origin, and none are of Socialist, German, or Scandinavian legal origin, indicators variables
for these later three groups interacted with the Africa indicator variable are dropped from the regression.
25aid the adverse effects of geography can be mitigated and alleviated, allowing the world’s poorest
countries to develop. Arguing against the effectiveness of foreign aid are those such as William
Easterly (2006a,b, 2007), who believe that the importance of geography lies in its inﬂuence on past
events, which have shaped the evolution of societies.25 It is felt that the reason for underdevelop-
ment has more to do with poor domestic governance, dysfunctional institutions, or poor economic
policies, all of which have deep historical roots. According to this view, aid rather than being a
panacea for underdevelopment, is largely ineffective and can even exacerbate poor governance,
hampering economic development.26
By focusing on a dimension of geography, terrain ruggedness, which varies throughout the
world and on a historical event, the slaves trades over the period 1400-1900, which is geographic-
ally conﬁned to Africa, we are able to separately identify the direct contemporaneous channel and
the indirect historic channel. We ﬁnd a direct negative effect of ruggedness on income, which is
consistent with irregular terrain making agriculture, building, and transportation more costly. We
also ﬁnd that rugged terrain had an additional effect in Africa during the 15th to 19th centuries: it
afforded protection to those being raided during Africa’s slave trades. By allowing areas to escape
from the detrimental effects that the slave trades had on subsequent economic development,
ruggedness also creates long-run beneﬁts in Africa through an indirect historic channel. We show
that this differential effect of ruggedness is found in Africa only, it cannot be explained by Africa’s
unique geographic environment, and it can be fully accounted for by Africa’s the slave trades. On
the whole, the results point to the importance of both a direct and an indirect channel through
which ruggedness affects income.
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Data appendix
Country boundaries
We assign geographic features to countries using digital boundary data based on the ﬁfth edition
of the Digital Chart of the World (us National Imagery and Mapping Agency, 2000), which we have
updated to reﬂect 2000 country boundaries using information from the International Organization
for Standardization iso 3166 Maintenance Agency and other sources. We exclude areas covered
by inland water area features contained in the same edition of the Digital Chart of the World. When
calculating the percentage of each country’s land surface area with certain characteristics or the
average value of a variable for a country, we perform all calculations on a 30 arc-second geographic
grid, correcting for the fact that the actual land area covered by a 30 arc-second cell varies with
latitude.
Land area
The land area data are from the Food and Agriculture Organization (2008), except for Macau and
Hong Kong where it is taken from the Encyclopædia Britannica.
Income per person
We measure average country-level income by the natural logarithm of real gross domestic product
per person in 2000. The data are from the World Bank World Development Indicators (World Bank,
2006). Units are 2006 international dollars, with purchasing power parity conversions performed
using the Elteto-Koves-Szulc method.
To check the robustness of our results to the use of income data from other time periods and
from an alternative source, in table 2 we use the natural logarithm of real gross domestic product
30per person in 1950 and in 2000, and its annual average from 1950–2000, with data from Angus
Maddison (Maddison, 2007, updated October 2008). Units are 1990 international dollars, with
purchasing power parity conversions performed using the Geary-Khamis method.
Gem-quality diamond extraction
Data on carats of gem-quality diamond extracted by each country between 1958–2000 are obtained
from the 1959–2004 editions of the Mineral Yearbook, published ﬁrst by the us Bureau of Mines
(us Bureau of Mines, 1960–1996) and then by the us Geological Survey (us Geological Survey,
1997–2007). We use the most recent data for each country-year in Volume i (Metals and Minerals),
completed with data from Volume iii (Area Reports: International) of the 1997–2000 editions. For
countries that have split or changed boundaries, we assign diamond extraction on the basis of
mine location with respect to current boundaries. The variable is then normalized by land area to
obtain carats of gem-quality diamond per square kilometre.
Percentage of each country with fertile soil
On the basis of the fao/unesco Digital Soil Map of the World and linked soil association com-
position table and climatic data compiled by the Climate Research Unit of the University of East
Anglia, Fischer, van Velthuizen, Shah, and Nachtergaele (2002) identify whether each cell on a
5-minute grid covering almost the entire land area of the Earth is subject to various constraints
for growing rain-fed crops. Based on plates 20 (soil moisture storage capacity constraints), 21
(soil depth constraints), 22 (soil fertility constraint), 23 (soil drainage constraints), 24 (soil texture
constraints), and 25 (soil chemical constraints) in Fischer et al. (2002) and the country boundaries
describedabove, wecalculatethepercentageofthelandsurfaceareaofeachcountrythathasfertile
soil (deﬁned as soil that is not subject to severe constraints for growing rain-fed crops in terms of
either soil fertility, depth, chemical and drainage properties, or moisture storage capacity). Cape
Verde, French Polynesia, Mauritius and Seychelles are not covered by the Fischer et al. (2002) data,
so for these countries we use instead the percentage of their land surface area that is classiﬁed by
the Food and Agriculture Organization (2008) as arable land or permanent crop land.
Percentage of each country with tropical climate
Using detailed temperature and precipitation data from the Climatic Research Unit of the Univer-
sityofEastAngliaandtheGlobalPrecipitationClimatologyCentreoftheGermanWeatherService,
Kottek, Grieser, Beck, Rudolf, and Rubel (2006) classify each cell on a 30 arc-minute grid covering
the entire land area of the Earth into one of 31 climates in the widely-used Köppen-Geiger climate
classiﬁcation. Based on these data and the country boundaries described above, we calculate the
percentage of the land surface area of each country that has any of the four Köppen-Geiger tropical
climates.
31Average distance to the nearest ice-free coast
To calculate the average distance to the closest ice-free coast in each country, we ﬁrst compute the
distance to the nearest ice-free coast for every point in the country in equi-rectangular projection
with standard parallels at 30 degrees, on the basis of sea and sea ice area features contained in
the ﬁfth edition of the Digital Chart of the World (us National Imagery and Mapping Agency, 2000)
and the country boundaries described above. We then average this distance across all land in each
country not covered by inland water features. Units are thousands of kilometres.
European colonial origin indicators
European colonial origin indicators are based on Teorell and Hadenius (2007). They distinguish
between British, French, Portuguese, Spanish, and other European (Dutch, Belgian and Italian)
colonial origin for countries colonized since 1700. For countries under several colonial powers,
the last one is counted provided that it lasted for 10 years or longer. Since Teorell and Hadenius
(2007) exclude the British settler colonies (the United States, Canada, Australia, Israel and New
Zealand), we code theses as having a British colonial origin. We complete their data using the
same rule to determine the European colonial origin of French Polynesia (French), Hong Kong
(British), Macau (Portuguese), New Caledonia (French), Nauru (British), Philippines (Spanish),
Puerto Rico (Spanish), and Papua New Guinea (British).
Legal origin indicators
Legal origin indicators (common law, French civil law, German civil law, Scandinavian law, and
Socialist law) are from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999). Some of our
regressions include French Polynesia, absent from their data, which we have coded as French civil
law.
African region indicators
Region indicators for Sub-Saharan Africa (East Africa, Central Africa, West Africa, and South
Africa) are from Bratton and van de Walle (1997). We assign African countries North of the Saharan
desert, which were not classiﬁed by Bratton and van de Walle (1997), to the region of North Africa.
Slave exports
Estimates of the number of slaves exported between 1400 and 1900 in Africa’s four slave trades are
from Nunn (2008). The data are constructed by combining shipping data with data from various
historic documents reporting the ethnicities of slaves shipped from Africa. Combining the two
sources, Nunn is able to construct an estimate of the number of slaves shipped from each country
in Africa between 1400 and 1900 during Africa’s four slave trades. We normalize the export ﬁgures
by a country’s land surface area, computed as explained above. Because some country’s have
zero slave exports, we take the natural logarithm of one plus the number of slaves exported per
32Table 8: Basic summary statistics, inside and outside of Africa
Standard Corr. with
Mean deviation Minimum Maximum ruggedness
Within Africa
Ruggedness 1.110 1.279 0.115 6.202
Log real gdp per person 2000 7.487 0.935 6.146 9.796 0.261
Diamonds 21.224 63.875 0 368.230 -0.118
% Fertile Soil 31.660 21.318 0 81.699 0.098
% Tropical Climate 52.098 42.985 0 100 -0.203
Distance Coast 0.430 0.357 0.000 1.254 -0.308
Slave export intensity 4.095 3.165 0 8.868 -0.538
Outside Africa
Ruggedness 1.424 1.113 0.003 5.301
Log real gdp per person 2000 8.934 0.979 6.666 10.965 -0.231
Diamonds 0.502 3.382 0 34.385 -0.139
% Fertile soil 42.767 26.527 0 100 0.040
% Tropical climate 35.862 45.601 0 100 -0.150
Distance to coast 0.273 0.433 0.000 2.206 0.040
Notes: The table reports summary statistics, inside and outside of Africa, for our ruggedness measure and for our core
set of control variables. The table also reports pair-wise correlation coefﬁcients between ruggedness and each control
variable. For these, , , and  indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. In the sample, the number of
African countries is 49, and the number of non-African countries is 121.
thousand square kilometres. See Nunn (2008) for more information on the nature of the data,
including why it is appropriate to use the natural logarithm of slave exports.
Quality of governance
To measure the quality of governance in each country, we use the composite variable “rule of law”
from version vii of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators database (Kaufmann et al.,
2008). It consists of “perceptions of the extent to which agents have conﬁdence in and abide by the
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police,
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al., 2008, p. 7).
Distance to export markets
Four variables measuring the distance from each country to the closest slave market in each of
Africa’s four slave trades are taken from Nunn (2008). For the trans-Atlantic and Indian Ocean
slave trades, the measure is the sailing distance from the point on the coast that is closest to the
country’s centroid to the closest slave market for that slave trade. For the trans-Saharan and Red
Sea slave trades, the measure is the great-circle overland distance from the country’s centroid to
the closest slave market for that slave trade. Units are thousands of kilometres.
33Population density in 1400
The data are constructed using historic population estimates from McEvedy and Jones (1978). For
countries grouped with others in McEvedy and Jones (1978), we allocate population to countries in
the group according to the distribution of population in 1950, obtained from United Nations (2007).
We normalize total population in 1400 by the land area of each country, calculated as described
above. Because the variable is extremely skewed to the left and because the territory covered by
some countries today had zero population density in 1400, we take the natural logarithm of one
plus population density (measured in people per square kilometre).
34